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Pegram's Significance for Managed Health Care
Louis Saccoccio, J.D."
On June 12, 2000, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Souter,
the U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, held in Pegram v. Herdrich that "mixed eligibility"
decisions made by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under
ERISA . In so ruling, the Court upheld the concept that the reasonable
sharing of financial risk with HMO' network physicians for providing
health care to a given patient population does not run afoul of ERISA's
fiduciary requirements. This result is a significant victory for managed
health care plans, their network physicians, and their members.
Although the decision's impact on the viability of physician risk
sharing is clearly positive, the decision's impact on the question of HMO
liability under ERISA remains less clear. Some, including the U.S.
Department of Labor, argue that this case represents a shift in ERISA
preemption law. They argue that Pegram now precludes ERISA preemption
of state law causes of action aimed at HMO coverage determinations that
involve questions of medical-necessity or experimental or investigational
treatments. A more reasonable reading of the case, consistent with its facts,
however, leads to the conclusion that Pegram represents nothing more than
a common sense answer to a simple question. What law should apply when
a treating physician makes a treatment decision that may arguably raise
issues of eligibility for coverage? Pegram's answer does not represent a shift
in the law regarding ERISA preemption of HMO coverage decisions.
The importance of Pegram does not end, however, with its resolution of
the question of the scope of ERISA's fiduciary requirements in the realm
of a physician's practice of medicine. The greater impact of the Pegram
decision may lie in its language addressing the proper role of the courts in
addressing the social and policy questions that arise from managed health
care. In this regard, the Court in Pegram unambiguously stated that the
debate about managed care belongs not in the courts, but in the
legislature. This clear message already is having an impact in class action
* Louis Saccoccio is General Counsel to the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP).
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litigation filed against health plans where broad allegations under ERISA
and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
4
seek to challenge (some would say destroy) managed health care practices.
Cynthia Herdrich originally brought medical negligence claims against
Dr. Lori Pegram, and Carle Clinic Association (Carle), as well as state law
fraud claims against Carle and its HMO, Health Alliance Medical Plans, in
Illinois state court.5 The medical negligence counts went to trial in state
court resulting in a $35,000 verdict for Herdrich. Carle and Health
Alliance Medical Plans removed the state fraud claims to federal court
alleging that they were preempted by ERISA. The federal district court
dismissed the state fraud complaint, but allowed Herdrich to amend her
claims to state a claim under ERISA. Herdrich's amended claim alleged a
breach of ERISA fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants. The claim
was premised on the fact that the physician owners of the HMO potentially
were entitled to year-end bonuses based on the difference between the cost
of providing medical care and HMO revenues. Herdrich argued that this
created an improper incentive to limit treatment. The federal district court
subsequently granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended
ERISA claim for a failure to state a proper claim, and Herdrich appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
decision, finding that Herdrich had alleged sufficient facts to make a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Pegram was the application of
ERISA's fiduciary duty principles to HMO treating physicians who make
"mixed eligibility decisions." The Court had no occasion to address the
issue of whether HMO coverage decisions involving medical-necessity
issues fall outside the scope of ERISA's preemption of state law.
Nevertheless, the issues are closely enough related to pose the question of
whether Peg-ram has brought a shift in the law that narrows the application
of ERISA preemption with respect to HMO coverage decisions involving
medical necessity.
Any application of the Pegram decision to the question of ERISA
preemption of state law for liability arising from HMO coverage
determinations must be made in light of the facts before the Court. The
heart of the case before the Supreme Court was simply a treating
physician's misdiagnosis of appendicitis. As a result, Herdrich was able to
convince an Illinois state court jury that Pegram failed to properly
diagnose her condition, and was awarded $35,000 in damages for her
injuries. However, because it was alleged that Pegram's year-end
compensation was based in part on the financial health of the HMO,
Herdrich argued that Pegram's misdiagnosis, coupled with her ostensible
1 (2001)
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interest in the financial health of the HMO, raised the issue of breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA.
The Court rejected Herdrich's claim that the HMO, acting through its
physician owners, breached its duty to act solely in the interest of
beneficiaries by making decisions affecting medical treatment while
allegedly being influenced by the terms of the HMO physician
compensation structure. In doing so, the Court expressed doubt that
Congress intended physicians to be treated as ERISA fiduciaries to the
extent that they make "mixed eligibility decisions" during the course of
treating their patients.8
The Court correctly recognized that when examining the question of
whether a treating physician acted for good medical cause, as opposed to
his or her own financial interest, the answer to that question "would
require reference to standards of reasonable and customary medical
practice in like circumstances. ' '9 The Court noted however, that this is the
very standard used in medical malpractice cases: "[F]or all practical
purposes, every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a
mixed decision would boil down to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary
standard would be nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally
applied in actions against physicians."0 As a result, the Court saw no reason
to turn traditional medical malpractice cases into ERISA fiduciary cases
simply because the treating physician assumed some of the financial risk
for the treatment of the patient.
Thus, Pegram is a case about treating physicians, medical malpractice,
and ERISA fiduciary implications of malpractice in light of physician risk
sharing. The Court rightly recognized that it would be folly to convert
standard malpractice actions, involving treating physicians that take place
within the HMO context, into ERISA fiduciary actions. However, this
conclusion is a far cry from the position taken by some in the trial bar and
by the Department of Labor (see below) that Pegram stands for the
proposition that HMO coverage decisions involving questions of medical
necessity are now subject to state tort actions.
In September 2000, the Department of Labor filed an amicus curiae
brief before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Pappas v. Asbel." This
case is again before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after the U.S.
Supreme Court, on June 19, 2000, vacated the Pennsylvania court's earlier
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Pegram
2
The Department of Labor's brief in Pappas sets out its interpretation of
how it believes Pegram narrows ERISA preemption of state tort claims for
negligence. As discussed below, the Department of Labor's interpretation
ranges far beyond the holding in Pegram.
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The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its initial decision
in Pappas was whether state law negligence claims against an HMO, U.S.
Healthcare, were preempted by ERISA. "' The claim arose from an alleged
delay in the HMO's authorization to transfer the plaintiff to a hospital
capable of treating his condition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in
this initial decision that negligence claims against HMOs do not "relate to"
ERISA plans, and are therefore not preempted.
1 4
Interestingly, the Department of Labor previously had filed an amicus
curiae brief with the U.S. Supreme Court supporting U.S. Healthcare's
petition for certiorari in Pappas.'5 In that earlier brief, the Department of
Labor argued that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision was
overbroad and incorrect. The Department of Labor stated that ERISA's
fiduciary standards preempt state law because an HMO's coverage decision
is considered an act of health care plan administration even when medical
judgment about how to treat a patient is involved.
6
In the brief filed before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Pappas
on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Labor now
argues that the case should be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas to
decide whether U.S. Healthcare made a "mixed eligibility decision."' 7 The
Department of Labor claims that "Pegram holds that treatment decisions
and mixed treatment and eligibility decisions by physician employees of an
HMO are governed by state malpractice standards and not by ERISA
fiduciary standards." 8 According to the Department of Labor, if the Court
of Common Pleas finds that U.S. Healthcare made a "mixed eligibility
decision," as used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pegram, then there is no
preemption, and the state law claims may proceed against U.S.
Healthcare.' 9
The Department of Labor's interpretation of Pegram, as set out in its
recent amicus brief, attempts to expand the holding of Pegram far beyond
what the plain language of the decision supports. It extends the concept of
"mixed eligibility decisions" beyond the HMO treating physician addressed
in Pegram to the HMO itself, with no support or basis.
The foundation for the Pegram decision was a clear reluctance by the
Court to expand the concept of ERISA fiduciary principles to physicians
treating patients, with its resulting interference with traditional state
medical malpractice law. In contrast, HMO coverage decisions within the
context of ERISA employee benefit plans, even when involving medical
necessity, have traditionally been recognized as benefit determinations
within the purview of ERISA preemption. 20 Contrary to the position taken
by the Department of Labor, Pegram, dealing as it does with the decisions
of treating physicians, does little to change the landscape of ERISA
I1(2001)
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preemption for HMO coverage decisions.
Maybe more significant than the holding of Pegram, is Justice Souter's
discussion of managed care and the respective roles of the federal judiciary
and Congress as it pertains to addressing the debate about managed care.
After all, the holding that "mixed eligibility decisions" made by HMO
treating physicians should be left to state medical malpractice law does
little more than confirm what is probably already common practice. As a
direct example, Herdrich proceeded with and won a judgment in a state
malpractice action in her case. However, with the filing in the last eighteen
months of multiple class action lawsuits against several large health plans
alleging general violations of ERISA and RICO,2' Pegram gives the lower
federal courts clear direction as to how they should react to these cases and
their attempts to set health care policy through litigation.
The Court recognized that for more than twenty-seven years, Congress
has promoted the formation of HMO practices, and stated that:
If Congress wishes to restrict its approval of HMO practice to certain
preferred forms, it may choose to do so. But the Federal Judiciary would
be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO
organizations [sic] if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim
portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their
structure, untethered to claims of concrete harm.22
The impact of this message already has been felt in a recent decision
that should directly influence the outcome in the numerous class action
lawsuits mentioned above. The case, Maio v. Aetna, was decided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on August 11, 2000.23 It affirmed the
dismissal of a class action lawsuit filed against Aetna and its regional
subsidiaries that was based on alleged violations of RICO. Significantly, the
Third Circuit relied in part upon the Supreme Court's analysis in Pegram
when finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under RICO.
In its opinion, the Third Circuit examined the plaintiffs' damage
theory in light of Pegram. The court indicated that absent specific
allegations by the plaintiffs that the quality or quantity of their benefits
under the health plans had been diminished, the "only theoretical basis for
appellants' claim that they received an 'inferior health care product' is
their subjective belief that Aetna's policies and practices are so unfavorable
to enrollees that their very existence . .. demonstrates that they overpaid
for the coverage they received."
24
Looking to Pegram, the Third Circuit rejected this theoretical basis for
recovery. The court stressed that under this theory the plaintiffs would be
asking the court to pass judgment on Aetna's policies and practices leading
5
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to a "myriad of practical problems, which undoubtedly arise in a situation
in which the federal courts are asked to determine the social utility of one
particular HMO structure as compared to another.,15 The court refused to
accept the plaintiffs' notion implied by their complaint that it should
evaluate the social utility of Aetna's health plans. To stress this point, the
court indicated that this theory would require the trier of fact to
"inappropriately act as a state regulatory commission and determine the
value of Aetna's product.,
26
The Third Circuit's refusal to pass judgment on a health plan's
otherwise legal policies and practices with its "myriad of practical
problems" gives a clear signal that Pegram's most significant impact may
come from its clear message of restraint to the federal judiciary in the
debate about managed care.
The Court's decision in Pegram has given the federal courts direction
when addressing physician compensation arrangements and risk sharing in
the context of ERISA. It has validated the concept that the treatment
decisions of physicians, even if mixed with ERISA eligibility questions, are
to be left to the purview of state medical malpractice law. Moreover, the
Court's resolution of these issues does not mean a shift in how the federal
courts should analyze ERISA preemption questions relating to HMO
medical-necessity decisions. Contrary to the views of the Department of
Labor, Pegram did not hold that HMO coverage decisions involving
medical-necessity issues are subject to state medical malpractice law.
Pegram's most significant impact, however, may be in its call forjudicial
restraint when federal courts are faced with broad challenges to managed
health care practices. The Court's clear message was that the courts were
not the appropriate venue for making health care policy; that
responsibility remains with Congress.
I1(2001l)
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